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Abstract 
This thesis examines how asymmetric information causes issues in online markets 
and how it leads to mispricing between buyers and sellers. Asymmetric information 
and its negative effect on traditional markets have been examined by earlier studies 
but we strive to test the the theory on an online market. This is tested by looking at 
how review systems affects the market and whether this information can mitigate the 
problem of asymmetric information. This is done by looking at data from Airbnb and 
from this data we build a multivariate regression to see how reviews affect prices. 
Our results show that a higher review score corresponds to a higher price and this 
indicates that buyers value the information provided by the review system. We can 
also see that an increase in the number of reviews has a significant impact on prices 
and this allows us to determine that asymmetric information is a problem in the 
market. By observing this we can conclude that online markets are affected by 
asymmetric information and that review systems is a method for mitigating the 
problem. The study does not include time series data or data from other online 
markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Today we do a large part of our consumption through online marketplaces. Websites 
like eBay, Amazon and Airbnb connect buyers with sellers worldwide and provide a 
chance for individuals to enter new markets. However, an issue with online markets 
is the lack of information between buyers and sellers. In a regular market quality is 
observed by inspecting the good visually and physically. In an online market the 
buyer can only decide on the quality of the good based on the information provided 
by the seller.    
Economic theory defines this as information asymmetries (Varian, 2010). More 
precisely, it means that one part possesses more information about the quality of the 
good than the other does. Online markets recognize the problem with asymmetric 
information and try to reduce the asymmetry with the use of review systems. The role 
of a review system is to decrease the information asymmetries by providing buyers 
with valid information about the quality of the good.  
Given this background, the goal of this thesis is to empirically test if asymmetric 
information is present in an online market and if a review system can alleviate the 
problem. The purpose is to test whether microeconomic theory can help us 
understand issues of contemporary online markets. 
We chose Airbnb as a representation of an online market. The website is an example 
of a sharing-economy, which allocates resources more efficiently among individuals 
through peer-to-peer matching. Travelers in search of a room match with a host, 
without the involvement of a major third party such as hotels and hostels (Byers, 
Prosperpio and Zervas, 2013). The Airbnb market is of relevance to the thesis since 
it is an online market where trust and review systems are vital. This is due to the 
uncertainty of renting an unknown person’s residence without any guarantees that 
the quality is as promised. 
Our data set is cross-sectional and contains over 25 500 listings posted in London. 
The data includes complete information on listed prices, reviews, location, type of 
property, the host’s profile etc. We use a multivariate regression model to study how 
review systems affect prices and see if information, in the shape of reviews, can 
alleviate the problem of asymmetric information. The study does not include data 
from other online markets, time-series data or final prices.  
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1.2 Disposition 
The thesis is structured as follows: In section 2 we present theory behind asymmetric 
information and discuss how it applies to Airbnb. In section 3 we present the data 
and method used. In section 4 we present our results. In section 5 we discuss results 
and limitations. In section 6 we conclude the study. 
2. Theory 
The theory section consists of two main parts. First, we present how asymmetric 
information causes market inefficiencies. We discuss ways of mitigating the issue of 
asymmetric information and then examine how these theories apply to Airbnb. 
Second, we state our hypotheses and discuss how to test them with the help of our 
theoretical framework. Subsequently we formulate predictions and test them 
empirically. 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
To understand the role of asymmetric information in online markets it is useful to 
obtain a theoretical background of the issue. In microeconomics a condition for a 
market to be in equilibrium is the presence of symmetric information (Varian, 2010). 
More specifically, this means that both parties have access to an equal amount of 
information about the good and that there are no additional costs for obtaining this 
information. If one party possesses more information about the good than the other 
does, there is a risk that they will not disclose the information in order to obtain a 
better price.  
The thesis will look at an example based on George A. Akerlof’s paper “The Market 
for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism” to see how asymmetric 
information can affect a market explicitly. The example is; assume a second hand car 
market with one hundred cars available. The sellers are fully aware of the cars’ 
quality while the buyers are not. In our example, half of the cars in the market are of 
good quality, defined as plums, and half of the cars are of bad quality, defined as 
lemons. Sellers are willing to sell a plum for $2000 and a lemon for $1000. Buyers 
are on the other hand willing to buy a plum for $2400 and a lemon for $1200. If 
symmetric information was present, the price on the market for any given plum would 
be between $2000 and $2400 and the price for any given lemon would be between 
$1000 and $1200. However, because of the information asymmetries regarding 
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quality the buyer cannot tell the difference between a plum and a lemon. Therefore, 
buyers are only willing to pay the expected value of any given car on the market. The 
expected value of a car on the market is calculated: 
 𝐸𝑉(𝑐𝑎𝑟) 	= 	0.5 ∗ 2400 + 0.5 ∗ 1200	 = 	$1800 
 
At the price of $1800, the buyers will accept either a plum or a lemon. But in order for 
trade between buyers and sellers to be possible, sellers who own plums have to 
lower their prices from $2000 to $1800. This creates an incentive for sellers to 
choose the worse quality plums and the definition of the process is adverse selection, 
which is a consequence of asymmetric information (Varian, 2010).  
When the next trade takes place the quality has fallen, due to adverse selection, and 
this causes the expected value to go down even more. This example allows us to 
understand that when sellers and buyers value a good differently, due to the 
imbalance of information available, the market will be in disequilibrium. This insight 
will be important for later when we apply our theoretical framework.  
Having exemplified how asymmetric information affects markets, we now move on to 
discuss how to alleviate it. The natural solution to asymmetric information is to return 
the information state on the market to something that resembles information 
symmetry. Varian (2010) presents signaling as a way of alleviating asymmetric 
information by informing the part with an information disadvantage. The signal might 
be very costly (in terms of time and/or money) to acquire, but provides an assurance 
of quality for the other part. Akerlof (1970) provides an example of how signaling is 
used against asymmetric information and defines it as counteracting institutions. He 
mentions guarantees as a counteracting institution since they signal a certain quality 
for the buyer. The guarantee makes the seller obliged to compensate the buyer if the 
quality is not sufficient. This creates an incentive for the seller to sell high-quality cars 
since selling low-quality cars would be costly in the long run.  
Having presented the theoretical background of the issue we will now turn to how it 
relates to Airbnb. As mentioned in the introduction, the buyers in an online market 
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only possess information about quality provided by the seller. The uncertainty 
increases because buyers and sellers rarely meet in person and play non-repeated 
games. This applies to Airbnb since the seller possesses more information about his 
or her accommodation than the buyer, and their real-life interactions are limited. The 
risk is therefore, in similarity with Akerlof’s example, that the seller uses this 
imbalance to rent out low-quality accommodations, depicted as a high-quality 
accommodation in the ad. However, Airbnb mitigate this issue by encouraging 
renters to leave reviews about hosts and their accommodation (Airbnb, 2016). The 
review system works as a signal that provides information about quality to the 
buyers. For the sellers, signaling becomes a cost when not delivering the quality 
promised in the ad. This behavior will most likely result in bad reviews, which incur 
future losses as fewer people make reservations. 
2.2 Applying theoretical framework 
This thesis aims to test if asymmetric information is present in the Airbnb market and 
if a review system can alleviate the issue of asymmetric information. By applying our 
theoretical framework on our thesis statement we conduct a thought experiment. The 
theory tells us that a condition for a market to be in perfect equilibrium is that buyers 
and sellers have the same amount of information about the quality of the good. If this 
is true then the price on the market should reflect this information. However, when a 
market is in disequilibrium due to asymmetric information buyers and sellers value 
the good differently which leads to mispricing. This means that the market price does 
not reflect all information about the good.   
From this reasoning, we test if asymmetric information is present in the market by 
providing more information about the good, in form of reviews, and then observe if 
this information has a significant impact on prices. If there is no asymmetric 
information in the market prices will not change because the market already 
incorporates all information about the good. But if we do have asymmetric 
information in the market the reviews will give the buyers better information about the 
quality of the good and the price will move closer to equilibrium. However, in order for 
this to work the information provided must be useful to the buyers. 
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 This reasoning allows us to state the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1.  The review system provides useful information for the buyers. 
If this hypothesis holds true then we can predict that buyers will reward a higher rated 
listing with a higher price. 
Hypothesis 2. Asymmetric information is present in the Airbnb market  
If this hypothesis holds true we predict that more information, in form of reviews, 
changes the price towards equilibrium. 
3. Data and Methodology 
In order to test our hypotheses we use a large data set with listings from the Airbnb 
market. From this data set we obtain information about each listings price, review 
score and number of reviews. By using a multivariate regression model including 
these independent variables, with price as our dependent variable, we observe how 
the amount of information in the market, in form of reviews, affects prices. To get the 
“all else being equal effect” of reviews we include a number of control variables.  
This section consists of two main parts, data and methodology. The data section 
examines our source material and evaluates our independent variables and control 
variables. The methodology section introduces our choice of econometrical model, 
considers potential econometrical problems with the model and finally introduces the 
specifications that allow us to test our hypotheses. 
3.1 Data  
Airbnb is an adequate representation of a market where uncertainty is present since 
it is highly based on trust between buyers and sellers. To examine Airbnb’s online 
marketplace we use insideAirbnb, a website that provides information on Airbnb 
listings in larger cities around the world. The website provides cross-sectional data by 
collecting all listings on Airbnb at different dates in 30 different cities around the 
world. We use a data set with over 25 500 listings available in London on the Airbnb 
website the 2 September 2015 (Cox, 2016). In order to validate the data we looked at 
a number of listings from the insideAirbnb data and found that they were still 
available on Airbnb’s website and that the information in the listings matched.   
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3.2 Variables 
Table 1 provides a brief presentation of the review variables. We provide a more 
detailed description of each variable in order to get a better understanding of the 
review system. 
 
Table 1: Review variables 
 
The review score rating is an overall score based on six criteria (Airbnb, 2016).  The 
first variable is “accuracy” and we interpret this as how well the listing matches the 
actual experience. The second variable is “communication”, how fast and accurate 
the host has answered questions. The third variable is “cleanliness”. The fourth 
variable is “location”, proximity to attractive locations. The fifth variable is “check in”, 
rating how smooth the check in process was. The sixth and last variable is “value”, 
presenting if the price was representable of what the buyer received. The website 
then provides an overall review score in the form of stars, 0-5, on these criteria. 
InsideAirbnb transforms the stars data into a scale from 0-100. Table 2 shows a 
description of the variable Review score rating and we notice that the standard 
deviation is high. To investigate this we created a histogram examining the 
distribution of the variable (Figure 1) 
Table 2: Review scores rating 
 
Variable Observations  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Value Max. Value 
Review 
scores 
rating 
25361 61.91041 42.88494 0 100 
 
 
Variable Description 
Review scores rating Review score between 0-100  
Number of reviews Number of reviews on the listing 
Zero reviews Dummy variable that accounts for users with 
zero number of reviews. 
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 Figure 1: Distribution of Review score 
 
The distribution in Figure 1 explains the high standard deviation. Distributions of 
review scores are unevenly spread; there is a large group with a zero review score 
and a large group with a high review score 80-100. Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) 
find similar patterns when looking into eBay’s review score system. They observe 
that only 50% of the buyers leave a review after purchase and if they leave a review, 
it is very likely to be a positive one. Their data set shows that the feedback provided 
by buyers was 0.6 % negative, 0.3% neutral and 99.1 % positive. 
The number of reviews variable tells us the number of reviews of each individual 
listing. From Figure 2 we observe that the distribution is similar to the one of the 
review score variable with a large group with a zero number of reviews. The mean of 
eleven review scores in table 3 shows that the average seller on the market is rather 
experienced. 
Table 3: Number of reviews 
 
Variable Observations  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Value Max. Value 
0
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0 20 40 60 80 100
Review score 0-100
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Number of 
reviews  
25361 11.44549 22.50431 0 336 
        
   
 Figure 2: Distribution of Number of reviews 
 
To account for the skewness in the review score and number of reviews variable we 
define a dummy variable, zero reviews, that takes a value of 0 if a user has zero 
number of reviews and 1 if the user has one review or more.  
3.3 Control variables 
A control variable is a variable held constant in order to evaluate the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables. By including control variables that 
affect prices, we receive a more accurate estimate of our review variables and at the 
same time alleviate the problem of omitted variable bias. Control variables’ traits are 
in no correlation with the independent variables but possess considerable 
explanatory power for the dependent variable (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).  
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The question is which variables have a significant impact on prices and should be 
included in the regression model. To answer this question we use a hedonistic price 
model that differs from traditional consumer theory. The hedonistic price model 
accounts for the value by looking at different characteristics of the good. Different 
characteristics create different utility for each individual. This provides a more 
versatile valuation of the good, and is not limited to only physical properties 
(Lancaster, 1966). This model can be used when evaluating real estate. The 
characteristic then includes both internal and external factors. Internal factors include 
physical features such as size, quality and type of accommodation. External factors 
on the other hand are more abstract features, features which individuals perceive as 
positive. Examples of these features are location and closeness to transportation 
systems (Monson 2009).From this theoretical model, we conclude that the control 
variables in Table 4 are of interest. Table 4 presents a detailed description of each 
control variable.  
Table 4: Control variables 
Variable Description 
Distance from center Distance from the center in London 
measured in km 
Borough A dummy variable that accounts for each 
of the 33 boroughs in London. 
Room type Type of room; entire home/apartment, 
private room or shared room 
Property type Type of property ranging from apartment 
to yurt 
Accommodates  Number of people the listing 
accommodates 
 
An important factor when it comes to choosing accommodation in a city is location. 
We assume that the average traveler prefers housing that is close to the city center. 
The listings do not provide this information so we had to create a new variable, 
Distance from center, by inserting each listing’s coordinates and the coordinates of 
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the city center1 into a distance formula in Excel. We also considered the preferences 
of consumers when it comes to which areas they wish to stay in London. The large 
variation in prices between neighborhoods in London shows the difference in 
preferences among consumers. In our data, this information is available so we chose 
to create a dummy-variable, Borough, to control for the borough2 of each listing.  
We know that different consumers have different preferences when it comes to 
housing options. The preferences we chose to include consist of type of room, 
property type and customers accommodated. Type of room itself consists of entire 
home, private room or shared housing. Property type consists of apartment, house, 
bed & breakfast, etc. “Accommodates” denotes number of people accommodated.  
3.4 Choice of model 
In order to look at the relationship between prices and reviews we use a multivariate 
regression model. By adding other factors than reviews into the model, we control for 
the affect these factors have on prices. By getting this “all else equal effect”, we 
receive a better estimate on how review systems affect prices in the market 
(Wooldridge, 2002).  
When using a linear regression model with OLS estimate of the parameters, a 
number of criteria need to hold. By meeting these five OLS criteria, the model meets 
the criteria for BLUE (best linear unbiased estimation). Acquiring BLUE helps our 
regression model to better estimate the relationship between reviews and prices in 
the market. If one of the OLS criteria does not hold, we can conclude that the 
estimators might be biased or inefficient (Wooldridge, 2002). We state the criteria 
below and evaluate how they connect to our model.  
 
1. Linearity in parameters  
This implies that the regression model represents the studied 
population. The model has an intercept and needs to be linear in 
parameters.  
 𝑦 = 	𝑎 + 𝛽6𝑥 + 	𝜀 
																																								 																				
1	Center	is	defined	as	location	of	Sharing	Cross,	London.	
2	London	consists	of	33	boroughs,	see	appendix.		
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Where 𝑎 is the intercept and 𝛽6 is the slope parameters of the 
population respectably. This criterion holds true in our model.  
 
2. The expected value of the error term is zero, regardless of the value of the 
independent variable.  𝜀 𝜀𝑋 = 0 
This implies that the independent variables are uncorrelated with the 
error term. A correlation with the error term would be problematic since 
it suggests that there are variables that are not included in the model. In 
our regression model, this could be an issue since there are many 
factors that affect prices in a market and there is a risk that we have not 
accounted for these. 
 
3. The variance of the error term is the same, regardless of the value of the 
independent variable.  𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝜀𝑋 = 𝜎; 
This implies that the variance of the residuals has to be constant. 
Otherwise, the model suffers from heteroscedasticity. If the variance 
changes in each observation, it will result in unreliable standard errors. 
We do not know whether our data suffers from heteroscedasticity. 
However, by adjusting for heteroscedastic consistent standard errors 
we can alleviate the problem.  
 
4. The error terms in separate periods are uncorrelated.   𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝜀>𝜀? = 0 for all       i ≠ j. 
Correlation between error terms ε>	and 𝜀?  implies serial correlation.   
However, this will not be an issue in our model since we use cross 
section data and not time series data. 
 
5. No perfect collinearity 
This implies that there cannot be a perfect linear relationship between 
each independent variable. If perfect collinearity existed, it would 
reduce the prediction reliability of the individual parameters. This is not 
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an issue regarding our regression model since none of our independent 
variables are perfectly correlated.   
 
6. The error terms are normally distributed.  
This regression requirement is only necessary for BLUE, normally 
distributed error terms are not required for an adequate OLS estimation 
of the parameters.  
3.5 Econometric issues 
We need to consider the second and third criterion in our regression. The second 
criterion considers heteroscedasticity and the third criterion considers the issue of 
omitted variable bias.  
One assumption that needs to hold in order to get a good OLS estimation of the 
parameters is homoscedasticity. Homoscedasticity is a constant variance of the 
unobservable values in the error term, related to the independent variables 
(Wooldridge, 2002). However, homoscedasticity condition does not show whether 
our parameters of the dependent variables are biased. The homoscedasticity 
condition only states the efficiency of OLS estimation of the parameters. The 
opposite of homoscedasticity is heteroscedasticity, an inconsistent variance of the 
unobserved values in the error term. 
Given heteroscedasticity, the OLS estimators of the parameters are inefficient due to 
an undervaluation of covariance and variance. A wrong estimation of covariance and 
variance result in wrong estimation of standard errors. The wrong estimation of 
standard errors will possibly lead to the wrong interpretation of the effect of given 
independent variables. For example, independent variables might seem significant 
when they in fact they are not (White, 1980). In our regression model, we consider 
this issue by adjusting for heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, also known 
as Huber-White standard errors. 
The second econometric issue we consider is misspecification of our regression 
model. In our model, we assume the presence of omitted variable bias since there 
are many factors that affect prices in the market that we do not have data on. When 
we state our multivariable regression model there is a risk that we have variables that 
explain our dependent variable, but that are not included in the model. We can 
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illustrate this with an example (Studendmund, 2013). If our true model is the 
following: 𝑌> = 	𝑎 +	𝛽6𝑋6> +	𝛽;𝑋;> +	𝜀> 
 𝜀> is our error term. We have not included 𝛽;𝑋; in our model because it is not in our 
data or we somehow missed it then our model we be the following: 𝑌> = 	𝑎 +	𝛽6𝑋6> +	𝜀>* 
The 𝛽;𝑋; will now be included in our error term 𝜀>	instead: 𝜀> ∗	= εB +	β;X;B	 
This will result in our error term being dependent on our explanatory variables, unless 
they are fully uncorrelated with each other, which is very unusual. This violates our 
second assumption that the error term should be independent of our explanatory 
variable, 𝜀 ⊥ 𝑋. To mitigate this problem, we chose to include as many control 
variables in our model as possible. 
3.6 Model specification 
We are now ready to specify our regression models in order to test our predictions. 
By including different amounts of controls in our specifications, we can observe 
whether we have mitigated the problem of omitted variable bias or not. In the last 
model, we run a White-test in Stata in order to evaluate the potential problem for 
heteroscedasticity.    
 
 
 
Model 1:  We regress the price of listing i  𝑃> 	= 	𝛼 +	𝛽6𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠> +	𝛽;𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒> 	+ 𝐵S𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠> + 𝜀> 
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Model 2: We regress the price of listing i in borough b as 𝑃>,V 	= 	𝛼 +	𝛽6𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠> + 𝐵;𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒> 	+ 		𝐵S𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠>+ 𝛽W𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝑡𝑜	𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟> +	 𝛽V𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ>VV + 𝜀>			 
Where b indicates borough in question.   
Model 3: We regress the price of listing i in borough b, type of property type p, room 
type t 												𝑃>,V = 	𝛼 +	𝛽6𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠> +	𝛽;𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒> +	𝛽S𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑠>+ 𝛽W𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝑡𝑜	𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟> + 𝛽\𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠> +		 𝛽V𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ>VV+	 𝛽]𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒]] + 𝛽𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒__ +	𝜀>	 
Where p indicates type of property type and t type of room 
 
Model 4:  We regress model 3 with the white test for heteroscedasticity.  
 
 
4. Results  
The results are presented in Table 5, it contains our four model specifications with 
the three independent review variables. Model 1 is without control variables, Model 2 
includes the control variables distance from center and boroughs and Model 3 and 4 
contains all the control variables. The results show that all beta-coefficients are 
significant with a p-value less than 0.01. 
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Table 5: Regression results 
 
 
Hypothesis 1.  The review system provides useful information for the buyers. 
If the first hypothesis would hold true, we predicted that buyers would reward a 
higher rated listing with a higher price. The results show that the variable review 
score rating in model 3 has a positive marginal effect of +$0.256 for every increase in 
review score point. This result tells us that buyers are willing to pay a higher price for 
a higher review score, which shows that they value the information that reviews 
provide as useful. Consequently, we cannot reject our first hypothesis.  
Figure 3 presents the relationship between price and review score, dividing seller into 
quantiles. Figure 3 displays that most sellers receive a review score between 80 and 
                                              Model 
           Variable                         (1)                                  (2)                             (3)               
 
           (4) 
 
Number of reviews 
 
 
Review score rating 
 
 
Zero reviews 
 
 
Constant  
 
 
R2 
 
N 
 
 
 
 
-0.177 
(6.24)** 
 
0.124 
(2.75)** 
 
19.215 
(4.61)** 
 
89.336 
(22.20)** 
 
 
0.00 
 
25,357 
 
 
-0.279 
(10.24)** 
 
0.214 
(5.00)** 
 
28.707 
(7.22)** 
 
148.929 
(5.79)** 
 
 
 0.10 
 
 25,357 
 
 
 
-0.302 
(14.64)** 
 
0.256 
(8.09)** 
 
        42.002 
(14.30)** 
 
        84.451 
        (4.46)** 
 
 
        0.52 
 
        25,351 
                           
-0.302                  
(15.42)** 
 
0.256                
(8.37)** 
 
42.002                                                   
(13.30)**  
 
84.451                 
(7.58)** 
 
 
0.52 
 
25,351                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Notes:	t-values	in	parentheses.	*p<0.05;	**	p<0.01,		
Model	1	contains	no	control	variables.	
Model	2	includes	the	control	variables	distance	to	center	and	borough.		
Model	3	includes	the	control	variables	distance	to	center,	borough,	room	type,	property	type	and	accommodates.		
Model	4	includes	the	same	control	variables	as	Model	3.	
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100. A second observation displays that sellers with a zero review score set a price 
above $105 whereas sellers with a review score between 80 and 100 set a price 
around $97.     
 
Figure 3: Relationship of Price ($) and Review score 
	
Hypothesis 2. Asymmetric information is present in the Airbnb market  
The theoretical framework tells us that if we have asymmetric information it will cause 
the market to be in disequilibrium. Because of this, the price does not reflect the true 
quality of the good due to mispricing. By increasing the amount of useful information 
in the market, in form of reviews, we predicted that prices will better reflect the quality 
of the good and would therefore move closer to equilibrium. From model 3 in table 5 
we observe a significant negative marginal effect of -$0.302 on price with each 
additional review. This shows that the information provided has a significant impact 
on prices. Consequently, we cannot reject our second hypothesis; asymmetric 
information is present in the market.  
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Figure 4 presents the relationship between prices and number of reviews, dividing 
sellers into quantiles. In Figure 4 a fitted line displays a negative relationship between 
prices and number of reviews. It shows that more reviews results in a lower price. A 
second observation displays that sellers without reviews set a price above $105.   
Figure 4: Relationship between Price ($) and Number of reviews  
 
4.1 Limitations 
A fourth model complements the third model specification in table 5 in order to test 
for potential heteroscedasticity. By adding the robust command after the regression, 
Stata considers heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (Angrist and Pischke, 
2008). This eliminates incorrect interpretations while testing hypotheses (White, 
1980).Table 5 visualizes the result of the new specification.  
The difference between model 3 and model 4 is different t-values, due to the 
consideration of potential heteroscedasticity in model 4. For example, the t-value of 
number of reviews is now 15.42 instead of 14.64. Note that the table shows no 
difference in significance level between the model 3 and model 4. 
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To address the problem of omitted variable bias we complement our regression 
model with control variables to achieve a more accurate estimation of our review 
variables. Studendmund (2013) states four types of specification criteria used to 
evaluate if control variables have generated a better regression. The first criterion 
considers the theoretical perspective and questions whether it is logical to include the 
control variable. The second criterion considers the significance of the explanatory 
variables effect, examining whether it remains significant after the control variables 
are included. The third criterion considers R2 and whether R2 adjusted for degrees of 
freedom improves after adding the control variables. The fourth and final criterion is 
bias. It considers whether the explanatory variables’ coefficients change significantly 
after adding the control variables.     
As stated in the method section, the risk of spurious results due to omitted variable 
bias is present in the model since we assume that there are many other factors 
affecting prices of listings. This implies that the first criterion holds, it is logical to 
include control variables since some explanatory variables are omitted.  By observing 
our regression results in Table 5 we can also conclude that our second criterion 
holds, our t-test shows that all coefficients are still significant when we add more 
control variables. The third criterion holds as well when looking at Table 5, our 
adjusted R2  has increased with each specification. The final criterion used to 
evaluate if the control variables have generated a better result hold as well. We 
observe changes in the coefficients when including more control variables. 
Investigating each specification criteria for a better regression indicates that adding 
control variables has provided a less spurious result. 
5. Discussion 
The results stated that buyers value the information in form of reviews as useful. The 
marginal effect of +$0.256 per increase in review score confirms our first hypothesis. 
At first, it appears that this effect is rather low. However, it is important to consider 
that the variable is based on a scale from 0 to 100 review points. These review points 
are then transformed which to a 5-star score system on Airbnb’s online market. A 
one-star increase in review rating is equivalent to a 20 points increase, which would 
generate a price increase of $5.12 in total. The results confirm our previous 
theoretical discussion that a review system is a form of signaling that assures quality 
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for the buyers. Our results are in line with those of Lewis (1987) who studied the 
second hand car market on eBay and found that by including more pictures and 
disclosing personal information in the listing, the buyers were willing to pay a higher 
price. Lewis (1987) argues that this is a method for mitigating the problem with 
asymmetric information in online markets.  
Our second hypothesis stated that asymmetric information is present in the Airbnb 
market and the reasoning behind was that if a market possesses information 
asymmetries it is in disequilibrium. By adding useful information to the buyers, there 
will be a significant effect on prices as the market moves closer to equilibrium. This 
appears to hold true when examining our variable number of reviews, which has a 
negative marginal effect of -$0.302 per additional review.  
By observing Figure 3 and Figure 4 it becomes clear that sellers with a zero in review 
score and a zero in number of reviews tend to set a price that is significantly higher 
than other sellers3. Our independent variable Zero reviews in shows the overpricing 
effect in table 5, which in model 3 has a marginal effect of +$42. From this, we 
conclude that new entry sellers tend to overprice in comparison with experienced 
sellers. The reason for this behavior is ambiguous but experiments conducted show 
that when individuals are given a new asset to sell, they tend to overprice that asset 
(Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R H., 1980). Economic theory defines this 
behavior as the endowment effect. If new sellers overprice, it seems natural that the 
marginal effect of number of reviews is negative since the equilibrium price would be 
lower than the overprice set by the new entry sellers. However, this is just our 
interpretation, something our result does not confirm.  
Given the results, it is important to be critical to our model as well as our methods. 
We will therefore discuss potential issues and limitations in both our theoretical 
framework and with the data. It could be questioned how well a review system is in 
fact a solution for decreasing asymmetric information. Observing the distribution of 
review scores in Figure 1 we see that there is a skewness in review scores. If the 
review scores were an adequate representation of quality, it would state that almost 
all listings are of excellent quality, which is between 80 and 100 in review score. This 
is however very unlikely. Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) observes that up to 50 % of 
																																								 																				
3	By	using	an	if-function	in	Excel	we	can	conclude	that	sellers	with	zero	review	score	also	has	a	zero	in	number	
of	reviews.	
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eBay users do not leave reviews at all. We suspect that many users do not leave 
reviews on Airbnb either. These circumstances indicate that review systems are 
limited when it comes to an accurate representation of quality. If reviews were a 
better representation of quality, we assume that our results would show a smaller 
change in prices as the number of reviews increases.  
In the section where we apply our theory, we stated that price is a representation of 
quality and we further stated that in equilibrium, price carries all the information about 
the good. This is problematic because prices on differentiated goods, such as real 
estate, are determined by the utility different factors create for each individual. It is 
therefore unlikely that all buyers will value the information given in a similar way. 
However, we assume most individuals prefer similar characteristics such as 
cleanliness, location and closeness to transportation systems.       
It could also be questioned if the data is optimal for the purpose of the thesis. Cross 
sectional data collects all information from a specific time and from that data we build 
our case. However, if we had access to Panel data we could obtain a better 
measurement of how each single review affects prices in a certain time period. From 
this information, we would see if the price change is greater for the first number of 
reviews in comparison with the hundredth number of review. To be able to observe 
this over a time period would have strengthened our results.  
It would also be useful to have data on booked prices instead of prices provided by 
the sellers. However, since our sample is relatively large, over 25 500 listings, we 
assume that the prices are an adequate representation of the booked prices on the 
market. If we had data available on the number of completed bookings for each 
listing it would have helped us to further validate our results. By using this data, we 
could have controlled for the risk of renters not leaving a review and thus get a more 
robust result. It would also be useful to have data from other online markets to further 
validate our results.   
	
6. Conclusion  
This thesis sought to study empirically the presence of asymmetric online markets 
and if review systems can alleviate this issue. We establish a theoretical framework 
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in order to understand the concept of asymmetric information and its implications. 
Applying this framework on the Airbnb market lead us to two hypotheses: asymmetric 
information is present in the Airbnb market and the review system can alleviate this 
issue by providing useful information for buyers.  
By using a multivariate regression model on cross sectional data from the Airbnb 
market, our results show that our two hypotheses cannot be rejected. The results 
indicate that asymmetric information exists in the market and that it can be alleviated 
with a review system. In our discussion, we mention limitations regarding our method 
and our results. For instance, our data shows that a vast majority of the reviews tend 
to be overly positive, which indicates that it is not an optimal reflection of quality and 
thereby not optimal for alleviating asymmetric information. For future research it 
would be interesting to conduct a similar study with the help of time series data and 
panel data. This would allow for a more robust examination of how a review system 
affects the market.   
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Appendix 
 
List of London’s 33 boroughs organized in alphabetical order  
Boroughs  Included in sample Location in London 
Barking and Dagenham X Outer 
Barnet X Outer 
Bexley X Outer 
Brent X Outer 
Bromley X Outer 
Camden X Inner 
City of London X Inner 
Croydon X Outer 
Ealing X Outer 
Enfield X Outer 
Greenwich X Inner 
Hackney X Inner 
Hammersmith and Fulham X Inner 
Haringey X Outer 
Harrow X Outer 
Havering X Outer 
Hillingdon X Outer 
Hounslow X Outer 
Islington X Inner 
Kensington and Chelsea x Inner 
Kingston upon Thames X Outer 
Lambeth X Inner 
Lewisham X Inner 
Merton X Outer 
Newham X Outer 
Redbridge X Outer 
Richmond upon Thames X Outer 
Southwark X Inner 
Sutton X Outer 
Tower Hamlets X Inner 
Waltham Forest X Outer 
Wandsworth X Inner 
Westminister X Inner 
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Type of rooms available at Airbnb 
Room type  Included in sample 
Entire home X 
Private room X 
Shared room X 
 
Type of property available at Airbnb 
Property type Included in sample  
Apartment X 
Bed & Breakfast X 
Boat  X 
Bungalow X 
Cabin X 
Camper/RV X 
Chalet X 
Condominium  X 
Dorm X 
House X 
Island X 
Loft X 
Other X 
Parking Space X 
Tent X 
Treehouse X 
Villa X 
Yurt X 
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Linnear regression results with control variables 
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